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In the death of Arlene B. Hadley, for twenty years Registrar of
the Yale Law School, the School has lost a loyal officer and the JOUR-
NAL a faithful friend. Counsellor to five deans, she gave integrity,
efficiency, and continuity to administration, solving many of the vexing
problems of academic life. The School is a better place to work in for
her work in it. A warm memory remains.
THE IMAGE IN THE MIRROR: THE FUNCTIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT TODAY AS REFLECTED IN ITS
CURRENT OPINIONS
"Of the writings of the Fathers there is no certain matter
agreed upon."
Andrew Home, The Mirrour of the Justices (c. 1300).
"Why it's a looking-glass book, of course I And if I hold it
up to a'glass, the words will all go the right way again."
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass.
IT has been little more than ten years since Mr. Justice Roberts expatiated
THE IMAGE IN THE MIRROR
so bravely on the simplicity of the judicial process.1 The intervening decade
has demonstrated that the simplicity was at least deceptive enough to make
the Justice change his mind more than once.2 Since then the Court has been
more circumspect in its pronouncements.
But other writers have more than made up the deficiency. In the spate of
explanations let loose by the judicial revolution of 1937 and its aftermath,3
1. "When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not con-
forming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the government has only
one duty; to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which
is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former." United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-3 (1936). And cf.: "All, therefore, which we have to do is, first to
ascertain, on the ordinary principles of construction, what is the true meaning of any of the
Articles [of Religion] alleged to be infringed; next, what is the fair interpretation of the
language used by Mr. Heath; and then, finally, to decide whether, by his language so
construed, he has or has not put forward doctrine which contradicts the Articles:' Heath v.
Burder, Brodrick & Fremantle's Ecclesiastical Cases 212 (1862).
2. Compare Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939), uith United States v. Butler,
supra note 1. Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) in
which Mr. Justice Roberts cast the deciding vote, with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 293
U.S. 238 (1936).
3. Most of this literature has not survived the decade. Some of the more worth-
while contributions are CARR, THE SuPaRM CouR AND JUDICIAL REVmW (1942) (an
able presentation, by a political scientist, of judicial review as a non-judicial political
function) ; COHEN, THE FATH OF A LmERAL, c. 19, Constitutional and Natural Rights in
1789 and Since (1946), (an outright attack on the institution of judicial review, dis-
cussed in Rostow, Book Review, 56 YALE L. J. 412, 414 (1947)) ; CoawIn, THE Co::-
sTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (8th ed., 1946) (previous editions published in
1924, 1930, 1937, 1938, and 1941 provide a useful historical resum6 of constitutional doc-
trine although the arrangement of the text perhaps lends itself too easily to purely con-
ceptual treatment); CORwIN, CoNSITrrrrOAL REvOLUTiox, LTD. (1941) ; Coawmn, CouRT
OVER CoNsTrUTioN; A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw AS ANT INST D U I T oF Por'uum
GovERmENT (1938); CoRwi, TOTAL WAR AND THE Co NsTurTio; (1947); Co aw.:,
THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPaEM COURT (Storrs Lectures, Yale University, 1934) (As
the outstanding judicial historian of the 'thirties, Corwin's natural concern with the con-
stitutional question appears somewhat less justified today than it was ten years ago.);
CURrIs, LioNs UNDER THE THRONE (1947) (reviewed infra pp. 1458-73) ; Fna~mpuram,
LAW AND POLITIcs (1930) (a collection of essays providing a key-perhaps-to the
enigmatic Justice) ; JAcKsON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941) (an in-
terpretative history of the crisis of the 'thirties) ; KonErSKY, CnmF Jusrcn Sro:,'a Alm
THE SUPREME CoURT (1945) (a scholarly study, couched largely in terms of Hamilton
and Braden's "special competence" notion, infra); SwisHm, THE GrowTH o Co:;s~rr-
TIONAL PowER IN THE UNITED STATES, c. 9 (Walgreen Lectures, University of Chicago,
1946) (the judicial process as integration and justification of governmental activity).
Braden, Umpire to the Federal System, 10 U. oF CHL L. REv. 27 (1942) (a pre-
scient account of the beginnings of a new assertion of judicial power in terms of statutory
interpretation, after the constitutional weapon had been effectively blunted); Hamilton
and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50 YALE LJ. 1319 (1941)
(the source of one of the leading current doctrines of judicial review) ; Kennedy, Portrait
of the New Supreme Court, 13 FoRD. L. REv. 1 (1944), 14 FoRD. L. RE,. 8 (1945) (a
forthright expression of the desire for certainty at all costs) ; Pritchett, The Coming of
the New Dissent: The Supreme Court 1942-43, 11 U. or CH. L. REv. 49 (1943) ; Prit-
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ideas of judicial self-restraint, 4 special competence,r and ritual exposition of
an ideological pattern in day-to-day governmental action,0 among others, have
competed to define and justify the scope of the judicial function. The at-
tempt will be made here to analyze the Court's position among the agencies
of government, and in society at large, as expressed in the opinions of the
1946 term.
The Court is constantly concerned with the political problems involved in
its relations with the other branches of government, state and federal, as well
as with individual parties, both corporate and corporeal, at the bar of justice.
At the same time it is unavoidably aware of the impact of its opinions on the
structure of society itself. It would be short-sighted to distinguish these in-
chett, Dissent on the Supreme Court, 1943-44, 39 AM. PoL. Sc. REV. 42 (1945) ; Prit-
chett, The Divided Supreme Court, 1944-45, 44 MiCH. L. REv. 427 (1945) (these three
articles are written entirely in terms of statistical trends on the Court, not to be over-
emphasized, but nevertheless illuminating); Schlesinger, The Suprene Court: 1947, 35
FORTUNE 73 (an eager attempt to demonstrate, with pictures, that the Court divides not
on substantive issues, but on the wisdom of judicial self-restraint) ; Sears, The Supreme
Court and the New Deal, 12 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 140 (1945) (a vigorous reply to the
Kennedy argument supra).
Some of the early literature has retained more vitality than recent efforts: BEARD,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912, reprinted 1938) ; FRANKFURTER AND
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928) (with particular emphasis on
the historical development of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, and the expansion of its
discretionary powers) ; HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS, Parts I, I1,
(Harvard Studies in jurisprudence IV, 1930) (an exposition of the growth of judicial
review against the general philosophical background of jurisprudence and comparative
law) ; POWELL, THE LOGIC AND RHETORIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15 J. PULL. PSYC11.
AND SCI. METHOD 645 (1918) (an effective debunking of much of the carefully cultivated
mystery surrounding constitutional law). And see BROoKs ADAMS, TiE TIIEORY 0F
SOCIAL REVOLUTION c. 3, American Courts as Legislative Chambers (1913).
4. The feeling that the Court should make every effort to avoid substituting its judg-
ment for that of the legislature or the executive developed as a natural reaction to the
constitutional intransigeance of the pre-Roosevelt Court. ". . while unconstitutional ex-
ercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the government is subject to
judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-
restraint." Mr. Justice Stone, di'ssenting in ,United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-9
(1936). This is perhaps an inevitable philosophy for an authority without the sanctions of
an enforcement arm or the sanctity of elective office, CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 324,
but it seems of limited usefulness, despite the remarks of Schlesinger, supra note 3, in de-
ciding many of the complex issues before the Court today; moreover, it is too easily in-
voked on both sides of a substantive controversy.
5. Those who acknowledged judicial review as an historical fact, surviving even the
Court revolution of 1937, felt the need for a more positive philosophy. That need was
satisfied at least for a time by the notion that the scope of the Court's authority was
limited by a special competence to deal with certain kinds of problems, notably encroach-
ments on individual freedom, and not with others, notably government regulation of busi-
ness. This oversimplification of the idea subtly expounded by Hamilton and Braden,
supra note 3, has already involved its proponents in some of the paradoxes which those
authors suggest.
6. SWISHER, loc. cit. supra note 3.
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terwoven threads of decision as merely "adjective" and "substantive". It
would be foolhardy to attempt to unravel them. Yet the warp and woof of
the Court's work must be examined separately, in order to trace the pattern of
their interaction in the decision-making process.
A limiting condition on any such appraisal is the lack of agreement among
the justices themselves. A brief statistical excursion may serve to cast some
light on this problem, although the sample is necessarily so small that only
quite gross differences are significant.
TABLE 17
Non-Unanimous Opinions in Considered Cases
Total Non-Unainious Opinions
Year Opinions Number Per Cent
1900 196 46 23
1910 168 22 13
1920 223 39 17
1930 168 18 11
1935 160 26 16
1936 162 31 19
1937 170 46 27
1938 149 50 34
1940 169 47 28
1942 171 75 44
1944 163 94 58
1946 144 86 60
Table I indicates a definite increase over earlier decades in the percentage
of non-unanimous opinions. A corollary of this phenomenon is the growing
popularity of the separate concurrence, at least with certain justices.8 This
non-unanimity is accented by the predominance of 6-3 and 5-4 divisions,
which comprise more than half the total number of split decisions.0
7. Grateful acknowledgment must be made here to Professor H. C. Pritchett for the
guidance furnished by his statistical studies of previous terms of the Court, .stpra note 3.
In order to make this data consistent with his, the form of his work has been followed
almost exactly in this and the following tables. Only cases for which opinions were pub-
lished are included, and where two or more cases were considered together, they are taken
as a unit. The figures in this table for previous years 'are Professor Pritchett's.
8. The trend has been noted especially in Kennedy, supra note 3, and Field, Uncon-
stitutonal Legislation by Congress, 39 Am Por. ScL REV. 54 (1945). Mfr. Justice Frank-
furter is most often in separate concurrence. See letter from Thomas Jefferson to Justice
William Johnson, Oct. 27, 1822, in P.kovmR THE CoMPLEm JEFFERSON 318 (1943) (urg-
ing continuance of the institution of individual opinions).





Cases considered by less than the full Court are not included in this tabulation.
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TABLE II
Dissenting Opinions and Separate Concurrences by Each Justice
for the 1946 Term
Opinions Dissents Separate
Justice Participated In Number Per Cent Concurrences
Rutledge 144 39 27 14
Murphy 141 32 22 3
Frankfurter 144 30 21 16
Black 141 27 19 3
Douglas 139 28 19 4
Jackson 137 27 19 6
Burton 143 21 15 13
Reed 141 16 11 1
Vinson 140 12 8 0
The inclination to dissent seems fairly constant among the justices, as evi-
denced by Table II, with Mr. Justice Rutledge most frequent, but by a small
margin.10
When the Court is so frequently divided on a fairly even basis and with the
division signifying more than individual cantankerousness it is reasonable to
assume that further analysis may indicate definite groupings. In the light of
the figures contained in Table III, however, the bilateral structure of "liberal"
and "conservative" wings, suggested in earlier studies,11 appears to be breaking
down.' 2 Besides producing strange bedfellows,13 this trend makes more difficult
both prediction and justification of decisions, in terms of any single philosophy
or clash of philosophies.
10. The Chief Justice, as the arbiter of the Court, naturally records a very low num-
ber of disagreements.
11. Pritchett, supra note 3. Pritchett's admittedly crude division identified the "lib-
eral" justices as those who generally placed government above business and the individual
above government, while the conservatives followed the reverse order of priorities, As the
reconciliation of the two preferences becomes an increasingly complex problem, the simple
distinction falls down almost as badly as Schlesinger's procedural shibboleth, supra note 3.
12. The most noticeable departure from the statistical pattern is Mr. Justice Douglas'
defection from the Black-Rutledge-Murphy group. Nor are Justices Rutledge and Murphy
as much in agreement as they were. On what was once the other wing of the Court, the
fairly tight circle of Roberts, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Stone has been replaced by a
loose grouping of Frankfurter (well out in front), Jackson, and trailing uncertainly be-
hind, Reed and Burton. Reed has apparently lost his central position, but Burton's wide
spread of dissents may indicate that he is assuming the Reed mantle, despite his trend,
statistically, towards-the Jackson-Frankfurter group.
13. Justices Jackson, Rutledge, Frankfurter, and Burton dissented together in Everson
v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 67 Sup. Ct. 504 (1947); Justices Jackson,
Murphy, Frankfurter, and Rutledge dissented together in Harris v. United States, 67 Sup.
Ct. 1098 (1947) ; Justices Murphy, Black, and Jackson dissented together in Cleveland v.
United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
THE IMAGE IN THE MIRROR
TABLE III





S CS 0 E 4-
F Q > f P'
Rutledge - 74" 74 55 43 50 48 31 31
Murphy 74 - 78 66 47 44 40 31 33
Black 74 78 - 63 52 52 51 35 36
Douglas 55 66 63 - 51 51 50 38 31
Vinson 43 47 52 51 - 66 70 66 60
Reed 50 44 52 51 66 - 73 59 59
Burton 48 40 51 50 70 73 - 62 56
Frankfurter 34 31 35 38 66 59 62 - 66
Jackson 31 33 36 31 G0 59 56 66 -
But any examination of non-unanimous opinions, or even of decisions in
which an opinion is rendered, 14 necessarily presents a distorted picture of the
area of agreement on the Court. Aside from the successful operation of the
selective system of granting certiorari,15 which is itself evidence of a certain
fundamental agreement, the present Court has been able to hand down a
unanimous opinion, involving the constitutionality of the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act of 1935,16 which a decade ago might well have resulted in a
5-4 split. Without a dissenting voice, it has been able to prevent a circuit
court of appeals from enlarging the scope of judicial review of NLRB
orderslr to allow a conscientious objector to plead the invalidity of his classi-
fication after he had reported at a civilian public service camp,' 8 and to
include within the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act workers labelled
"independent contractors" who nevertheless had many of the incidents of the
employer-employee relation.19 Although the due process and commerce
clauses are still occasional if contentious restrictions on the states, neither
remains a substantial barrier to congressional action.-2
14. See note 7 supra.
15. Judicial Code, § 240, 36 STAT. 1157 (1911), as amended, 23 U.S.C. § 347 (1940).
16. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90 (1946).
17. NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 756 (1947).
18. Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338 (1946).
19. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 67 Sup. Ct. 1473 (1947).
20. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 294 (1946) (commerce clause) ; see Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 67 Sup. Ct 1672 (1947) (due process).
21. Braden, supra note 3, at 28; CoRwn, ToTAL WAR AND THE Co.NsTxo. 176
(1947) ; SwisHER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 210 (since the date of his writing, only one
congressional enactment has been held unconstitutional, note 25 infra) ; Stern, Thc Con-
19471
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Relations With Congress. When dealing with the elected representatives of
the people, the Court, composed entirely of post-1937 appointees, 2-" has under-
standably maintained at least the appearances of a complete hands-off policy,
even where fundamental civil liberties were involved. 23 In one of its only two
reversals of congressional action in the last decade, the Court almost found
itself in turn reversed, when a House committee recommended 2' that no ap-
propriation be made to meet the judgment in United States v. Lovett.2 The
notion, strange indeed to a student of the Old Court, that the Constitution
should serve to check the inroads of a "transient [conservative] majority in
Congress" has not again been advanced since it was adumbrated by Mr.
Justice Douglas in his Saratoga Springs dissent last term.20
The constitutional issue has, in so far as possible, been avoided, and the
Court has even chided the lower tribunals for raising it unnecessarily.2 1 In
only seven cases has the constitutionality of a federal statute been settled at this
term, in whole or in part, and then always favorably.28
nzerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 883, 946-7
(1946) ; Ganoe, The Roosevelt Court and the Commerce Clause, 24 OnE. L. REV. 71, 137
et seq. (1945). For a summary of all the cases up to 1932, see GAViT, TnE CoMMERcE
CLAUSE (1932) Appendices A-E.
For the present affirmative limits of the Eommerce power, see United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 67 Sup. Ct 1560 (1947) (Court rejected argument that monopoly of local cabs is
proscribed by Sherman Act simply because, as part of independent local service, passen-
gers are carried to and from interstate trains).
22. With the death of Chief Justice Stone, Mr. Justice Black, who had been appointed
by President Roosevelt on August 18, 1937, became the senior member of the Court.
23. Cf. Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (Mem.) 67 Sup. Ct. 979 (1947) (denying cer-
tiorari to review dismissal of government employee for alleged subversive activity) ; Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81
(1943) ; KONvrTz, THE ALIEN AND THE AsIATIc IN AMERICAN LAW, C. 11 (1946) ; Ros-
tow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945) ; Fraenkel,
War, Civil Liberties and the Supreme Court, 1941 to 1946, 55 YALE L. J. 715 (1946), But
cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (statutory presumption in criminal statute
invalidated as irrational).
24. 15 U. S. L. WEEK 2545 (April 1, 1947); but the House overrode the Com-
mittee recommendation, 15 U. S. L. WEEK 2557 (U.S. April 8,1947).
25. 328 U. S. 303 (1946).
26. New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 590, 594 (1946), 55 YALE L. J. 805,
Even while urging that the Court overrule South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437
(1905), Mr. Justice Douglas suggested that a constitutional amendment would be required
to change the judicially-fashioned immunities rule. 326 U.S. 572, 592 (1946).
27. Alma Motor Co. v.'Timken-Detroit Axle Co., 329 U. S. 129 (1946).
28. In three "of these cases, Fleming v. Rhodes, 67 Sup. Ct. 1140 (1947) ; American
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90 (1946) ; and Champlin Refining Co. v. United
States, 329 U.S. 29 (1946), constitutionality seemed a foregone conclusion: the first one
turned on a jurisdictional issue, the second was a unanimous decision, while in the last
the four-justice dissent differed only on statutory construction. A fourth case, United
States v. Carmack, 329 U. S. 230 (1946), involving eminent domain, was decided unani-
mously without serious constitutional dispute. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service
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The fate of the controversial Lea Act,* outlawing coercion of employers to
fill unnecessary jobs, was not settled in its first Court test. o Indeed, the most
controversial aspect of the Act, its application to peaceful picketing in alleged
contravention of the First Amendment, was not even reached3 1 The only real
issue in the case as decided was whether the uncertainty of identifying "per-
sons in excess of the number of employees needed"3 2 infringed due process.
The Court, with three justices dissenting and one abstaining, held that it did
not, yielding to the obvious intent of Congress, and the difficulty of otherwise
effectuating it. "The Constitution," Mr. Justice Black wrote, "does not require
impossible standards. '33
The second Hatch Act decision3 4 clearly involved the only significant con-
stitutional controversy over a federal statute; the opinions on the meritsP5
represent three attitudes toward the problem, with particular reference to the
First and Fifth Amendments. The majority argued that judicial and adminis-
trative precedent justify some regulation of "the political conduct of Govern-
ment employees," 36 and held that Congress could reasonably have determined
on this degree of regulation-a conventional "judicial self-restraint" argu-
ment.37 Mr. Justice Black maintained that the section was invalid on its face,
Comm'n, 67 Sup. Ct. 544 (1947) (one of a pair of cases dealing with the Hatch Political
Activity Act, 53 STAT. 1147 (1939), 18 U.S.C. § 61 (1940)) provided a short answer,
citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), to the contention that denial of federal
funds to state or local agencies whose officers or employees engage in political activity
violates the Tenth Amendment.
29. 60 STAT. 89 (1946), 47 U.S.C. § 506 (1946 Supp.).
30. United States v. Petrillo, 67 Sup. Ct. 1538 (1947).
31. Under direct appeal from dismissal of the information, the Court could deal only
with the validity of the Act on its face.
32. 60 STAT. 89 (1946), 47 U.S.C. § 506 (a) (1) (1946 Supp.).
33. United States v. Petrillo, 67 Sup. Ct. 1538, 1542 (1947).
34. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 67 Sup. Ct. 556 (1947).
35. The first question presented to the Court was whether 11 of the 12 appellants who
sought to enjoin enforcement of section 9(a) of the Hatch Political Activity Act, supra
note 28, and to have the provision declared unconstitutional, had stated in their complaints
any justiciable case or controversy. Because none of these 11 had engaged in any of the
prohibited activities since the Act had gone into effect, but only alleged their desire to do
so, a majority of five, Justices Murphy and Jackson abstaining, concluded that they had
not properly challenged the constitutionality of the Act. Air. Justice Douglas argued,
however, with 36r. Justice Black concurring, that it would be unreasonable to ask govern-
ment employees to jeopardize their jobs to test the statute, when the broad scope of the
declaratory judgment was available.
ir. Justice Reed, speaking for the majority, complained that "such generality of ob-
jection is really an attack on the political expediency of the Hatch Act, not the presenta-
tion of legal issues. It is beyond the competence of the courts... :" Id. at 564. Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas replied that "their proposed conduct is sufficiently specific to show plainly
that it will violate the Act. The policy of the Commission and the mandate of the Act
leave no lingering doubt as to the consequences." Id. at 578. Neither one suggested aban-
donment or modification of the traditional criteria of judicial competence.
36. Id. at 571.
37. See note 4 supra.
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because of its vague and sweeping prohibitions, and because it invades the
specific prohibitions of the First Amendment-a typical "special competence"
argument. 38 Mr. Justice Douglas dealt only with the application of the Act to
industrial workers as a class, and his concern, extensively documented, was
apparently with the disenfranchisement that might result under the Act in the
event of government ownership. This too is, at least formally, a "special
competence" argument, but the tone of the opinion suggests that the govern-
ment-in-industry problem'was its real basis.
In the great bulk of cases involving congressional enactments, however, the
Court has leaned heavily on statutory construction, frequently without
invoking constitutional support.8 9 The most debated issue becomes, therefore,
the meaning of the silence of Congress. 40 Although the already weakened
doctrine that silence is equivalent to acceptance41 appeared after the South-
Eastern Underwriters'42 case to be as dead in statutory interpretation as it is
in the law of contracts, it seems to have received a new lease on life.
The question was raised on the first decision day of the term, when Mr.
Justice Rutledge, concurring separately in Cleveland v. United States,40
inveighed against the notion that almost 30 years of congressional silence after
an early decision44 indicated acquiescence in the extension 6f the Mann Act to
cover non-commercial vice. The unusual circumstance of the concurrence was
that the majority rested its holding only by implication on the argued point,
and only secondarily on the precedent. Mr. Justice Douglas, for the Court, at-
tempted to show that the language of the Act itself, taken in its cultural con-
text, was plainly meant to include polygamy, the offence charged. Yet three
dissenting justices, in addition to Mr. Justice Rutledge concurring, centered
their attack on the earlier decision. 45 The revival of the "non-commercial
vice" issue gave the dissenters a long-awaited opportunity to attack at the
source. On the other hand, the majority had a choice! it could either start
38. See note 5 supra.
39. It is perhaps significant that in three of the most controversial cases of the term
in this area, neither dissent nor majority opinion argued a constitutional issue. Cleveland
v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) ; United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 Sup.
Ct. 677 (1947) ; Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 67 Sup. Ct. 789 (1947).
40. See Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 41 HAv. L. Rzv. 200 (1927), for an analysis of
the traditional doctrine.
41. "The psychoanalysis of Congress is a perilous venture when that body speaks and
a hopeless task when it is silent. It would seem that the only sensible course is to hold
that when Congress says nothing it means what it says." Sholley, The Negative Implica-
tlions of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. OF CHu. L. REv. 556, 588 (1936). See Lyon, Old
Statutes and New Constitution, 44 COL. L. REv. 599 (1944) (tracing the gradual disap-
pearance of the notion that Congress intends statutes to be interpreted in the light of the
constitutional limitations in force at the time of -their enactment). Cf. Girouard v. United
States, 328 U. S. 61 (1946), discussed in Fraenkel, supra note 23, at 731.
42. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
43. 67 Sup. Ct. 13, 16 (1946), 56 YALE L. J. 718 (1947).
44. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
45. Justices Murphy, Black, and Jackson dissented.
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fresh by distinguishing away the earlier decision, or it could rely on the
precedent, without offering independent reasons. It chose to strengthen its
position by doing both. The doctrine of silence as acquiescence was not a
necessary tool for the majority, but its obverse was essential for the dissent.
But when the dissent finds itself opposing a change in substantive law, it
invokes the silence-acceptance doctrine with considerable vigor, as did Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in a pair of patents cases,40 suggesting that congressional
action should be necessary to disestablish the doctrine that a licensee cannot
challenge the validity of a patent. And Mr. Justice Douglas, with the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Burton concurring, may have stretched the congres-
sional silence doctrine still further, in his dissent to the Packard1 decision
on the inclusion of foremen under the provisions of the National Labor Re-
lations Act.4 s His first argument can be put in syllogistic form: The impli-
cations of such a step as this for our economy are far-reaching. Congress made
no mention of foremen in the Act, either to exclude or to include them.
Therefore Congress must have intended not to include them. The doctrine
thus operates ex post facto, since the previous silence of Congress can be
taken to indicate approval of the Court's present position. Would it not be
simpler to admit ignorance of congressional intent?
No member of the Court has maintained an entirely consistent attitude
towards this problem of congressional ambiguity; to take Mr. Justice Frank-
furter as an example is not to imply that he is less consistent than his breth-
ren. His strongly worded patents dissent4 9 passed lightly over the fact that
the patents doctrine he asserted was in effect reversed four years earlier,O
without an audible response from Congress. ' In Confederated Band of
Ute Indians v. United States5 2 he was willing, with Justices Murphy and
Douglas, to enforce an "informal acknowledgement" by Congress of an em-
panded reservation grant, while his lone dissent in Insurance Group Cominit-
tee v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R.P3 carried deference to congressional intent to
an extreme point. The case involved a railroad reorganization which had
46. MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & M6anufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 402, 403
(1947) ; Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 394, 403 (1947)
(joint dissent). See infra p. 1376.
47. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 67 Sup. Ct. 789, 794 (1947).
48. 49 StAr.449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1940).
49. MacGregor v. 'Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., 39 U.S. 402, 403
(1947) ; Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 394, 403 (1947)
(joint dissent).
50. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173 (1942). Cf. Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U. S. 661, 672 (1944) (separate concurrence by Justices
Black and Murphy, castigating Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, id. at 673, on the ground
that it represented only his personal opinion, without precedent or authority).
51. But Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not go as far as Mr. Justice Douglas. See note
26, supra. And see infra pp. 1376 ff.
52. 67 Sup. Ct. 650 (1947).
53. 329 U. S. 607, 621 (1947).
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been once before the Court4 and came up again on appeal from the denial
of a motion for re-examination of the plan in the light of changed circum-
stances.5 5 The denial order was affirmed, on the ground that the allegations
of changed conditions were not specific enough to warrant upsetting so com-
plex and long-drawn-out an administrative and judicial determination. But
Mr. Justice Frankfurter raised an issue nowhere mentioned in the majority
opinion. Stressing the public policy issues involved, he pointed to the fact
that the Government, which had originally filed an amicu brief in favor of
the plan, had subsequently withdrawn. And he explained its withdrawal by
reference to congressional action to amend Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act. 56 The Justice proposed, therefore, that the Court withhold action on the
reorganization plan, until the expected congressional action had taken place.
In this instance, then, it took judicial audacity to exercise judicial self-re-
straint; and what might also appear to be restraint on the part of the ma-
jority in refusing to anticipate Congress, may be more akin to inflexibility
in the face of a clear, if not formal, declaration of congressional intent,
Relations with the Executive. Here, as elsewhere, the Court takes self-
restraint, as its frequently-expressed rule-at least until it finds grounds to
break the rule. Even the affirmance of an administrative order, upon re-
examination of the evidence, was criticized by Justices Rutledge and Frank-
furter, who chided the Court severely for reviewing the case on any other
grounds'than "abuse of [administrative] discretion." And in a situation
where the Court intervened only to break an administrative deadlock, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter dissented, declaring simply that "if it be said that thus
far deadlock has resulted, it does not follow that it will continue, if the
Court keeps hands off."58
But Mr. Justice Frankfurter again dissented59 when the Court allowed
the SEC to reissue an order previously reversed, on the ground that the new
order was based on findings explicitly within administrative experience,
while the previous one bad been based on an erroneous reading of judicial
precedents. And when the Court approved the administrative discretion of
the NLRB in certifying as a bargaining unit plant guards serving as auxiliary
military police, thereby giving judicial approval to the administrative recom-
54. RFC v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
55. District and circuit court actions unreported.
56. 49 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1940). Congressional action had been
temporarily frustrated by Presidential veto, but only because the President had felt that
the bill was too weak to accomplish its stated purposes. His veto message had elicited a
response from members of both Hotises, representing both parties, which indicated that a
new measure would promptly be enacted. Insurance Group Committee v. Denver &
R.G.W.R.R., 329 U. S. 607, 622 (1947).
57. Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U. S. 441, 449 (1947).
58. Order of Ry. Cbnductors v. Swan, 329 U. S. 520, 530 (1947).
59. SEt v. Chenery Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1575, 1584 (1947). Mr. Justice Jackson joined
in this dissent, the Justices withholding their opinions until the next term of Court.
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mendations embodied in a War Department circular, Justices Frankfurter
and Jackson were joined in dissent by the Chief Justice.r0
Mr. Justice Jackson was again unwilling to trust the discretion of the
NLRB when he alone dissented from a decision approving the Board's policy
against post-election challenges."' He based his dissent on the fact that the
Board had exceeded its discretion because there was no opportunity for
anti-union employees to challenge ballots before or during the election, al-
though the employer was able to challenge at those times. But since this
action was brought by the employer to contest the result of an election, it
should be clear that there is substantial identity of interest between em-
ployer and anti-union employees. It could be argued that Mr. Justice Jack-
son was rather substituting his judgment for that of the Board, on the ad-
ministrative question of the point at which election results should become
final. Whatever the substantive merits of his arguments, they indicate the
inutilify of the "hands off" doctrine as an index of prediction; its impact is
easily avoided.
Only in the ICC cases are the latent complexities and paradoxes of the
Court's relations with the executive made plain. Two rate cases are in-
volved, one concerned with regional differentials,02 and the other with differ-
entials between means of transportation.0 Both cases raise issues of statu-
tory authority as well as of administrative discretion.
The regional rate case arose over the ICC's attempt to enforce a recent
amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, extending the prohibition
against discrimination by adding the words "region, district, territory".04
When the Commission, pending further inquiry, ordered an overall regional
adjustment, not only lowering rates in the South and West, but also raising
them in the North and East, the states themselves sought an injunctionFP
The opinion of 'Mr. justice Douglas affirming the ICC's order for the Court,
reads rather like the report of an administrative commission or congressional
committee than like the normal work-product of the judiciary. Its graphs,
charts, and statistics serve their purpose admirably, but it is a purpose alien
to orthodox concepts of the judicial function, and one to which the machinery
of the Court is not at present adapted. Yet the form of the opinion follows
logically upon its reading of the statutory command. The Court held that
regional discrimination could be proved even where actual discrimination
against individual shippers could not be shown because "discriminatory rates
60. NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1265, 1274 (1947) ; NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1274, 1282 (1947).
61. NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 335 (1946).
62. New York v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1207 (1947).
63. ICC v. Mechling, 67 Sup. Ct. 894 (1947).
64. Interstate Commerce Act, 24 ST.T. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 3 (1)
(1940).
65. New York v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 856 (1946).
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[might prove] to be such effective trade barriers as to prevent the establish-
ment of industries in those outlying regions."'0  And any kind of judicial
review of administrative action on so broad a scale, even though it give the
administrative agency more latitude than usual, must take the Court out of its
field of so-called special competence. The dissenting justices' resistance to
the Court's construction of the statute is perhaps understandable in view of
the extensive economic consequences of that construction, but it is only
excusable if procedural difficulties be allowed to govern substantive decisions.
The effect of statutory interpretation on administrative authority is again
evident in ICC v. Mechlintg. 7  The Transportation Act of 19400 authorizes
the ICC to "prescribe such reasonable differentials as it may find justified
between all-rail rates and the joint rates in connection with . . . [a] com-
mon carrier by water."' 9 The Commission prescribed a differential between
barge-rail and all-rail rates, which the Court found not sustained by sufficient
evidence since it, unlike the Commission, read the statute to require that
rate differentials be based on cost differentialsY° If the Court were correct
in its statutory interpretation, it was not interfering with the discretion of the
Commission. If it were incorrect, it was exceeding its self-defined legitimate
scope. In either event, unless it were to abdicate completely, it had to deal
in detailed fashion with material quite outside the scope of its so-called special
competence. To determine whether evidence is sufficient to sustain findings
of fact is a traditional appellate.function, but when the administrative finding
is that a given rate differential will produce "incurable chaos" in a rate struc-
ture, the function itself is transformed, and its traditional limitations have,
at best, questionable applicability.71
The Court found itself at another doctrinal crossroads in ruling on the
lawfulness of the search and seizure conducted in Harris v. United States.72
At the previous term, it had approved a narrowed application of the prohibi-
tion in the Fourth Amendment 73 to exclude "public papers" seized in a place
66. New York v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1207, 1219 (1947).
67. 67 Sup. Ct. 894 (1947).
68. 54 STAT. 899, 937 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 907 (1940).
69. Id. at § 907 (d).
70. ICC v. Mechling, 67 Sup. Ct 894, 900 (1947). The issue had come before the
Court once before, without a decision on the merits. ICC v. Inland Waterways Corp.,
319 U.S. 671 (1943).
71. One may speculate on the possibility of the Court being forced to reconsider, oil a
new level, the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898), abandoned in FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). Pekelis, The Case for a Jurisprudence of
Welfare, 6 LAw. GUiLD REv. 611, 616 (1946) asks: "But is it true that the courts are left
with the choice of being a rubber stamp or a bottleneck?"
72. 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947).
73. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Cotst.
AMEND. IV.
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of business.7 4 Now faced with a possible extension of that application to a
search of a private home, subsequent to an arrest on a routine criminal
charge,75 the same majority that had before upheld the action of the execu-
tive branch continued to uphold it,1 0 as against the paramount position of
civil liberties. Neither majority nor dissent relied particularly on the prece-
dent of the previous year; the opinion of the Court appealed to the equities
of the particular fact situation, and attempted to minimize its implications,
while the minority opinions looked to history, and attempted to maximize the
consequences of the decision. The opinions themselves do not seem to ac-
count for the fact that two of the justices popularly believed to be most ve-
hement in defense of civil liberties are in the majority, 7 while two former
Attorneys-General registered dissents.78 If, moreover, the alternatives are
posed in terms of impeding enforcement agencies in the execution of what
they reasonably consider necessary regulatory activities," or denying individ-
ual rights which the Court considers itself peculiarly competent to safeguard,
then the paradox of decision becomes more evident.80
Relations with the States. Judicial review of state statutes has counted for
more, in political as well as statistical significance, 8s than the periodic skirm-
ishes between Court and Congress. Perhaps more importance should be at-
tached, therefore, to this group of cases, than to any other under considera-
74. Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582 (1946) (seizure of OPA coupons) ; Zap v.
United States, 328 U. S. 624 (1946) (seizure of cancelled check by officers authorized to
make audit for government under war contract).
75. While searching defendant's home for stolen checks without warrant but incident
to lawful arrest, FBI agents found forged draft cards on which conviction vas based. The
Court did not, however, apply the "public papers" rationale, but rather argued that an
arrest warrant authorized a search of the entire premises under defendant's "immediate
control", relying largely on dicta, and a few holdings as to searches of automobiles during
prohibition.
76. Justices Black, Douglas, Reed. and Burton, and the Chief Justice formed the
majority.
77. Justices Black and Douglas concurred together in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 32
U.S. 143 (1944); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). But cf. Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Comm'rs, 67 Sup. Ct 910 (1947), and cases and articles cited supra note 23.
78. Justices Jackson and Murphy served successively as Attorneys-General under
President Roosevelt
79. Especially when the regulation partakes of the nature of anti-trust prosecutions.
See note 11 supra.
80. It is of course possible to offer other explanations of individual votes (Mr. Justice
Murphy's special concern with any infringement of civil liberties, Mir. Justice Douglas'
administrative background), but to account for individual choices is not to resolve the
dilemma.
81. "I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to
declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could
not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States." Law and the Court, speech
at Harvard Law School Ass'n dinner, Feb. 15, 1913, in HOLuEs, CoLrEcr LEGAL PA-
PERs 291, 295-6 (1920). And see GAvrr, loe. cit. supra note 21.
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tion. Recent developments suggest that special attention here is not unwar-
ranted.
A reluctance to reach the merits has characterized the decisions in this
field. The Court has been unwilling to consider even cases involving fund-
amental civil liberties, when the issues have not been made sufficiently precise
in the state court of last appeal ;82 it rejected a brave but perhaps insufficient
offer of sociological evidence on the issue of economic bias in the selection of
"blue ribbon" juries ;83 and, in determining whether or not a federal regula-
tory statute had preempted the field, it rested upon the determinations of the
appropriate administrative agencies, rather than venture unassisted into the
perilous field of congressional intent.8 4 And in decisions on the merits, the
pattern of self-restraint and "special competence" was broken, and the Court
appeared to be striking down state economic regulation, while it refused to
interfere with attacks on civil liberties.85 Subsequent discussion should make
the slipperiness of these concepts even more apparent.
Full consideration of the three cases in which state tax statutes were struck
down8 6 will be deferred for examination in their economic context.87  But it
should be noted that once the Court has decided, Mr. Justice Black dissent-
ing, 8 that prevention of the possibility of double taxation lies in its province,
82. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 67 Sup. Ct. 1409 (1947); cf.
Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 67 Sup. Ct. 1428 (1947). But cf. Clark v. Allen, 67 Sup. Ct.
1431 (1947), decided the same day, where in a much less controversial situation the Court
was willing to hypothesize about the facts. Mr. Justice Rutledge, who wrote the opinion
of the Court in the former cases, dissented as to that point.
83. Fay v. New York, 67 Sup. Ct. 1613 (1947). The Court rejected evidence that the
,proportions of social groups in the jury panel did not correspond to the proportions in the
community, absent a showing that an equal proportion of each group could meet the rea-
sonable standards set for the panel. Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting, and speaking for
Justices Rutledge, Black, and Douglas as well, claimed "a consiitutional right to a jury
drawn from a group which represents a cross-section of the community." But cf. Ballard
v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (Court reversed conviction by federal jury drawn
from all-male panel in jurisdiction where women eligible for jury service); Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217 (1946) (motion to strike federal jury panel should
have been granted where wage earners intentionally excluded).
84. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 67 Sup Ct. 1146 (1947) ; Rice v. Board of Trade
of Chicago, 67 Sup. Ct. 1160 (1947).
85. Compare Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), with Adamson v. California,
67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947). Compare Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoeing Co., 67 Sup.
Ct. 815 (1947), uith Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946). But cf. Independent Ware-
houses, Inc. v. Scheele, 67 Sup. Ct. 1062 (1947) ; Int'l Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S.
416 (1947).
86. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946) ; Freeman
v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) ; Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 67 Sup. Ct.
815 (1947), the latter two discussed in 56"YAL L. J. 898 (1947).
87. See infra pp. 1379 ff.
88. The Justice has made his position so clear, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761, 784 (1945) ; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 301 (1944);
J. D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938), that he no longer
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then the employment of the majority's purely verbal analysis, in which it
presumably has special competence, seems to result in outlawing the possibility
of any state taxation of large segments of the economy.
The Court has not chosen to reject these issues, nor the highly controversial
determination of the ownership of California offshore oil lands,89 although
they involved purely economic controversies; but it refused, in a curt per
curiam sentence, to rule on the constitutionality of the Georgia county elec-
toral system, on the ground that the question was a "political" one. 0 And
yet a legislative solution is possible in the former cases, while there is little
likelihood that legislators who have been elected on an inequitable distribution
of the franchise can be persuaded to remove the inequities. 1 The dangers
to the Court in intervening, 92 and the duty owed to those disenfranchised are
equally clear; to justify abstention as self-restraint is to debase that doctrine
to the level of expediency.
Both sides sought the same justification for their stands in the major civil
liberties controversy of the term over the inclusion of the Federal Bill of
Rights, by implication, in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .9 3  Defendant appealed his California conviction for murder, claiming
that the California statutory and constitutional provisions permitting the
prosecution to comment on the failure of the accused to testify in his own
behalf violated the provision against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amend-
writes a dissenting opinion in these cases. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand,
has come a long way from his dissent, with 'Mr. Justice Black, in McCarroll v. Dixie
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940) to his majority opinion in the Freeman
case, while Mr. Justice Jackson is still the strongest opponent of "Balkanization" of inter-
state commerce. Compare his concurrence in Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390, 400
(1941), Eith his dissent in Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 67 Sup. Ct. I052,
1074 (1947). And see JAcnsox,, op. cit. sntpra note 3, at 284.
89. United States v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1658 (1947). It is interesting to note
that the Court, in this somewhat confused opinion, did not consider that congressional
silence amounted to acquiescence in the assertion of ownership by the state.
90. Cook v. Fortson, 329 U. S. 675 (1946). Under the challenged system each county
has an equal voice in the selection of candidates at the party primary, without regard to
population.
91. Cf. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), 56 YALE L. J. 127. Mr. Justice
Rutledge, dissenting in the Cook case, urged that a rehearing be granted in tie Colerovo
case, and that the two be set for argument together. Justices Black and Douglas also
dissented.
92. But the Court did survive its intervention into the intensely political problem
presented by Southern discrimination against the Negro voter. Smith v. Allvright, 321
U. S. 649 (1944) ; cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941).
93. Adamson v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947); cf. Foster v. Illinois. 67 Sup.
Ct 1716 (1947) (fact that record does not disclose offer of counsel to defendant, who
pleaded guilty, does not necessarily violate Fourteenth Amendment, despite guarantee of
counsel in Sixth Amendment) ; Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173 (1946) (semble). But cf.
De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) and cases cited therein (conviction reversed
where absence of counsel held prejudicial).
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ment, incorporated by reference into the Fourteenth. His contention was
denied by five justices, and vigorously upheld by four.95 The issue was joined
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, who argued that, on the basis of
precedent, due process in the Fourteenth Amendment did not cover all of
the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and, rather than depend on
"subjective selection", the Court must determine whether "the whole course
of the proceedings . . . offend those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of English speaking peoples. . ."D Mr.
Justice Black replied, for the minority, that "one of the chief objects that the
provisions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment's first section . . .. were intended
to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to the states."' l
And he added a full historical appendix to prove his point, went on to casti-
gate the use of the "natural law due process formula" in the past "to license
this Court, in considering regulatory legislation, to roam at large in the broad
expanses of policy and morals .... ," and concluded by asserting that ap-
plication of 'natural law' deemed to be above and undefined by the Constitu-
tion" 99 makes judicial review an instrument for policy decisions unchecked
by legislative standards. It is reminiscent of the Old Court to find a Justice
on the present Court returning to the intent of the Fathers, after three-quar-
ters of a century of historical development. One might rather expect an ap-
praisal of what the-Amendment means today, recognizing it as a malleable
instrunient of policy, instead of attempting to crystallize its meaning in the
hope that a more rigid verbal formula would constitute any real check on the
future scope of judicial review.100
The Court has apparently reversed its stand on the relative viability of state
economic regulation, and regulation of individual rights and liberties. What
happens when the two problems coincide can be seen in Kotch v. Board of
River Port Pilot Commissioners.' A Louisiana statute requiring that cer-
tain river pilots be licensed state officers, made a six-months' apprenticeship
94. No person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to -be a witness against him-
self . . ."
95. Mr. Justice Reed wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Vinson, Bur-
ton, Frankfurter, and Jackson joined.
96. Adamson v. California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 1682, 1683 (1947).
97. Id. at 1686.
98. Id. at 1695, 1696. See HAINES, op. cit. sujpra note 3.
99. Ibid. But cf. Harris v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947), where Mr. Jus-
tice Black joined in exercising considerable discretion in the definition of what is a "rea-
sonabl&' search and seizure.
100. "When we are dealing with words that are also a constituent act, like the Con-
stitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its
begetters .... The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago." Mr. Justice Holmes in Mis-
souri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
101. 67 Sup. Ct. 910 (1947), 56 YALE L. J. 1276.
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one of the prerequisites for appointment. Apprentices are selected by a
pilot's association, formed by authority of state law, and in practice admitting
only friends and relatives of members. The constitutionality of the pilotage
law, thus administered, was before the Court, after the Louisiana Supreme
Court had ruled that there was no violation of the equal protection clause21 2
Mr. Justice Black's opinion held that the public benefits resulting from the
familial apprenticeship system could be sufficient to justify the nepotic ad-
ministration of a state law. Although Yick Wo z. Hophins0 3 was distin-
guished, and the peculiar circumstances of the piloting profession adverted to,
the case gives aid and comfort to the proponents of the already widespread
state anti-civil rights legislation.'" And although the statute here must have
the effect of excluding Negroes from the profession, no mention is made of
this possibility in the majority opinion.10 5
The basis of disagreement, however, is not that the majority differentiated
discrimination on account of consanguinity from discrimination on account
of race; it is rather that the majority refused to strike down the state
statute unless its purpose-as distinguished from its effect-was discrim-
inatory, or its provisions not reasonably related to the constitutional purpose
of protecting navigation. The dissent insisted that one need go further, and
determine whether the statute is constitutional in effect.'00
Without indulging in conjectural emendation of the Constitution, one can
fairly say that Mr. Justice Black and the majority are straining its language.
The Fourteenth Amendment says: "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall .. . deny to any person . .. the equal protection of the laws;"
not: "which shall be intended to deny." Mr. Justice Black has often but not
always acknowledged the preferred position of civil rights and liberties,107
but apparently here ignored the distinction between regulation of a man's
right to do business because of the way the business is done, and regulation
because of the color of the man's skin. As a dissenter both in the self-incrim-
102. 209 La. 737,25 So.2d 527 (1946).
103. 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (reasonable municipal police statute, administered so as to
discriminate against Orientals, held unconstitutional). See Ko-vrrz, op. i. stpra note
23, at 172.
104. See KoNvrTz, Tirx ConsxTrur=oz A14D CIVIL RIGHTS c. 8, app. 11 (1947).
105. The dissent admits that the discrimination was not "shown to be consciously ra-
cial in character," 67 Sup. Ct 910, 917, but finds that its effects cannot be distinguished
from such discrimination. See Waite, The Aegro in the Supreme Court, 30 Munn. L. RE%.
219 (1946) (an historical survey).
106. As Mr. Justice Rutledge puts it:
"Classification based on the purpose to be accomplished may be said abstractly to
be sound. But when the test adopted and applied in fact is race or consanguinity,
it cannot be used constitutionally to bar all except a group chosen by such a rela-
tionship from public employment." Kotch v. Board of River Purt Pilot Cumm'rs,
67 Sup. Ct. 910, 917 (1947).
107. See note 77 supra, and his dissent in Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Service Comm'm,
67 Sup. Ct. 544, 555 (1947), where a federal statute was involved.
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ination case*0 s and the gross receipts tax cases, 1 9 his dilemma here is appar-
ent. Although the paradox was sharpest for Mr. Justice Black, the case
should serve generally to dispel any suggestion that the Court can be neatly
arrayed on a single scale, running from dominance to submission. No one-
dimensional analysis can serve to interpret its multi-dimensional activities.1 10
The Court in Its Own Domain. If in its relations with other branches of
government, state and federal, the Court gives at least the appearance of walk-
ing softly, in its procedural dealings with the inferior federal courts, and with
parties before those courts, it carries a big stick, and shakes it from time to
time. At the 1946 Term the stick descended on a national bank receiver who
attempted to revive actions on which the Statute of Limitations had run be-
cause of defendant's death, of which he had no knowledge."' Mr. Justice
Rutledge, dissenting, suggested that the period of the Statute" 2 was intended
to be permissive, not mandatory, citing the recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules. The stick also descended on stockholders
seeking to bring derivative actions in a forum convenient for them but not for
the defendant corporations.113 And it descended on defendant Jehovah's
Witnesses who had sought to have their draft classification changed, and,
despairing of direct appeal under the then state of the law,"14 later had
brought proceedings in habeas corpus." 0  The Court held that habeas corpus
was not available to correct an injustice done by a misreading of the law in
the lower courts which did not go to the issue of jurisdiction. Three justices
dissented,-" pointing, to ample precedent for the use of the writ in much
less unfortunate situations, and to the importance of maintaining its flex-
ibility not "confined by rigidities characterizing ordinary jurisdictional doc-
trines."117
108. Adamson v. California; 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947), and cases cited note 93 supra.
109. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 815 (1947) ; Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
110. No attempt is made here to deal with those cases where even an overriding con-
cern for civil liberties served as a two-way signpost. See Craig v. Harney, 67 Sup. Ct.
1249 (1947) (freedom of the press held to override right to trial, in private controversy,
free from outside pressures); Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 67
Sup. Ct. 504 (1947) (appropriation for bus fares of children attending parochial schools
held not violative of First Amendment prohibition against establishment of religion, in-
corporated into Fourteenth Amendment). For a lay discussion of the latter case, sugges-
tive of some of the complexities involved, see 3 COMMENTARY 562 (1947).
111. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S: 482 (1947).
112. Under FED. R. Civ. P., 6(b), 25(a).
113. Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 828
(1947) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 67 Sup. Ct. 839 (1947), both noted in 56 YALE L. J.
1234. And see Braucher, The Inconvenicnt Fcdcral Forum, 60 HAIV. L. REv. 908 (1947).
114. The rule of Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), had not been obviated
by Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
115. Sunal v. Large, 67 Sup. Ct. 1588 (1947).
116. Justices Rutledge,.Frankfurter, and Murphy.
117. Sunal v. Large, 67 Sup. Ct. 1588, 1596 (1947).
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On the other hand, the Court at least negatively deferred to Congress, in
refusing to create a new cause of action for damages sustained by the United
States as a result of the negligent injury of a soldier by defendant's agent.118
Mr. Justice Rutledge's careful opinion begins by pointing to the inapplicability
of the Erie doctrine and the flexibility of tort law, but he goes on to recognize
the issue as one of federal fiscal policy rather than individual fault, and con-
cludes that since the operative facts are not of recent origin, Congress should
be left free to determine whether or not they constitute a cause of action, as
it had done in many similar situations. His reasoning seems worthy of
special note because it is devoid of absolutes, substantive or procedural.
The outstanding recent assertion of judicial power over parties is perhaps to
be found in United States v. United Mine Workers."0 After arguing that the
Norris-La Guardia Act'1 did not apply to the Government as an employer,
the Court went on to say that courts may punish violations of void, but
not "frivolous" orders by imposing the sanctions of criminal contempt. The
point was necessary only for an adjudication of criminal rather than civil
contempt,' 21 and it was based on at least questionable precedent -;122 some
significance, then, must attach to it.12 3 Another aspect of the case, the fusing
of civil and criminal contempt sanctions in a single unapportioned fine, mer-
its attention. While it seems inexact to criticize the Court, as Mr. Justice
Rutledge did,12 4 for reversing the rule of Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range
Co., 2  that a criminal penalty cannot be imposed in a civil contempt action,
yet its failure to separate the sanctions seems a dangerously loose procedure. 2-
Relying as heavily as it does on doctrines of restraint in the face of im-
118. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 07 Sup. Ct. 1604 (1947).
119. 67 Sup. Ct. 677 (1947).
120. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1940).
121. Of the five justices who were willing to hold the Norris-La Guardia Act inap-
plicable, two, Justices Black and Douglas, would have imposed only the civil sanction. Of
the five justices who concurred in the judgment, however, two, Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson, did not join in the opinion of the Court on the statutory construction issue, and the
other three argued the "void order" issue only as dictum. It would seem, therefore, that the
actual holding was confined to its peculiar facts.
122. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906).
123. Some of the broader implications of the holding are traced in Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge's dissent. United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 720 (1947). See
Comment, 47 YALE L. J. 1136 (1938).
124. Concurring opinion in Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67 Sup. Ct. 918, 923 (1947). In this
case the Court followed the Gompers holding infra.
125. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
126. It seems worthy of note that this assertion of judicial power was dissented from
only by justices who have been characterized, with perhaps more vigor than justice, as
"judicial activists." The "activist" fallacy has apparently penetrated even beyond our
shores. See Laski, Book Review, 59 HAnv. L. REv. 816 (1946) (criticizing Justices Black
and Douglas for "judicial legislation!').
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pinging governmental action,1 27 the Court perhaps tends to lose perspective
when operating unchecked in its own sphere.
THE COURT AS A DETERMINANT OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS
Yet the Court does not hold its political views in an economic vacuum.
The same group of decisions that suggests conclusions about the political re-
lations of the Court, also reflects its attitudes on economic problems, and the
interplay of effect may account, in part at least, for the inadequacy of ex-
planation exclusively in either terms.
In the extensive regulation of interstate commerce, Congress has had a free
hand for a decade, and continues to have one today. 2 The idea of a national
economy, 29 and of the necessity for regulating a wide variety of businesses
affected with the public interest,8 0 has been accepted by the Court. The
NLRB,1 1 the OPA13 2 and the SEC133 have largely been successful in main-
taining and extending the scope of their authority. Only the ICC has been
twice rebuffed, on the ground that it was not pioperly performing its statutory
function in that it denied shippers the full advantages of competition between
various forms of transportation. 34 Control of corporate management by pri-
vate individuals may be somewhat hampered, however, by the Court's rulings
in the two forum non conveniens cases.'8 0
I In the anti-trust field, the Court has, however, been split. The political
argument that congressional silence signifies assent, on which the four dis-
senting justices in the invalid patents cases rested their conclusion has been
127. For an extreme example see the dissenting opinion in Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67
Sup. Ct. 918, 928 (1947), suggesting that the administrative discretion of the SEC to issue
a subpoena should be checkmated by the judicial discretion of the federal district court to
refuse to enforce it in a civil contempt proceeding.
128. See note 21 mipra.
129. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (with
all the participating justices in agreement on the power of Congress) ; Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
130. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946) ; North American Co.
v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
131. NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1265 (1947); NLRB v. Donnelly Gar-
ment Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 756 (1947); NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324 (1946).
132. Fleming v. Rhodes, 67 Sup. Ct. 1140 (1947); Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking &
Lumber Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1129 (1947) ; Testa v. Katt, 67 Sup. Ct. 810 (1947) ; United
States v. Bruno, 329 U.S. 207 (1946). But ef. Parker v. Fleming, 329 U.S. 531 (1947).
133. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 67 Sup. Ct. 1575 (1947) ; Penfield Co. v. SEC, 67 Sup.
Ct 918 (1947).
134. ICC v. Mechling, 67 Sup. Ct. 894 (1947) ; United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,
329 U.S. 424 (1947). But cf. New York v. United 5tates, 67 Sup. Ct. 1207 (1947).
See WPRuD, JUsTIcE IN TRANSPORTATION (1945).135. Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 67 Sup. CL 82&
(1947) ; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 67 Sup. Ct. 839 (1947), both noted in 56 YALS L J.
1234. And see Braucher, supra note 113.
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indicated above, 136 and its timeliness questioned. The economic basis for
disagreement between majority and minority is perhaps clearer. Under
the doctrine approved by the Court,' 37 a patent licensee is encouraged to as-
sist in enforcing the anti-trust statutes; he is permitted to plead the invalidity
of the patent when sued for royalties by the patentee under an agreement con-
tamining a price-fixing clause, since such a clause would taint the entire agree-
ment with illegality if the patent were invalid.133 The dissent vas concerned
with impairment of contracts,139 while the majority was arious to give the
fullest possible scope to the enforcement of anti-trust policy.140
But a majority of five justices is a particularly unstable quantity on the
Court today. When a debtor attempted to plead the invalidity, under the
Robinson-Patman Act,' 4 ' of the purchase contract on which he was indebted,
the Court, by a 5-4 vote, referred him to his administrative remedy, and di-
rected him to pay the debt.1 42 And in the Trans-Wrap case,143 another
group of five justices put a severe limitation on the doctrine of Mcrcoid Corp.
v. Mid-Continwnt Co.,'44 and the long line of allied cases, which had held that
a patent may not be used to enlarge the scope of its monopoly by conditioning
its use on the use of other unpatented articles. In the instant case the Court,
by Mr. Justice Douglas, who had written the Mercoid opinion, held that a
patent may be validly conditioned on the assignment of improvement patents.
He argued that for private business to function as its own patent office--
employing the figure used in the Mcrcoid case-is in itself a violation of the
anti-trust laws, while it is not illegal to assign or to agree to assign a patent.'4 "
But he avoided the question of whether the illegality in the Aercohi line of
cases consisted in the do facto patenting of unpatentable articles, or simply in
the extension of the patent beyond its four corners. Once posed, the ques-
tion would have answered itself, since the control was condemned in those
136. Supra p. 1365.
137. MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947);
Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947).
138. Id. at 401. See Zlinkoff, Monopoly versus Competition: Sig:ificant Trends in
Patent, Anti-Trust, Trade-Mark, and Unfair Competition Suits, 53 YALE L. J. 514, 521
(1944); Steffen, Invalid Patents and Price Control, 56 YALEn L. J. 1 (1946).
139, MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., 329 U.S. 40P, 413-5
(1947); Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co., 319 U.S. 394, 413-5
(1947) (joint dissent).
140. Id. at 401-2. But the Court refused to pass on the invalidity of the price-fixing
agreement in the event that the patent ,was valid-perhaps in order to sccure a majority
on the first issue. Cf. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (dis-
cussed infra) ; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) ; United States v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
141. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13 (1940).
142. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 1015 (1947).
143. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
144. 320 U.S. 661 (1944), and cases cited therein.
145. 16 STAT. 203 (1870), as amended, 35 U.S.C. §47 (Supp. 1946).
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cases not as amounting to a monopoly, a requirement making proof almost
impossible, 146 but as tending in that direction. The suggestion, therefore,
that proof of actual anti-trust violation would be sufficient to reverse this
decision 14 7 appears' to be a disingenuous one, and the decision is clearly a set-
back to anti-trust enforcement.
Where the anti-trust problem has arisen in an alleged conspiracy between
a labor union and a group of employers, the Court resolved a policy conflict
in favor of the union. 148  Whereas it had once held that the Norris-La
Guardia Act does not protect a labor group when it joins with a non-labor
group to violate the Sherman Act,149 it here decided that Section 6 of the
Norris-La Guardia Act,150 requiring actual authorization or ratification of
acts of agents, applied to both parties in the alleged conspiracy.""' Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, dissenting with the Chief justice and Mr. justice Burton,
argued that Section 6 must have been intended only to require clear proof
of agency, not to "remove the legal liability of organizations for the conduct
of officials who, within the limits of their authority, wield the power of those
organizations."' 5 2  The difficulty that he found with the position of the
majority was again that it made proof almost impossible.153 The Court how-
ever, was apparently more anxious to protect labor from possible future at-
tacks, perhaps under an amended labor law, than to facilitate anti-trust prose-
146. Cf. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) ; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
147. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S, 637, 646-8
(1947). Mr. Justice Douglas specifically distinguishes the situation in the instant case
from that provided for in the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730, 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §14
(1940), making it "unlawful to condition the sale or lease of one article on an agree-
ment not to use or buy a competitor's article (whether either or both are patented),
where the effect is 'to substantially lessen competitign or tend to create a monopoly.'"
Ibid. But the assignment of improvement patents is equivalent to an agreement not to
acquire competitively the articles covered by them. Mr. Justice Douglas has made a dis-
tinction without a difference.
148. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. United States, 67 Sup, Ct.
775 (1947).
149. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797 (1945); Phila-
delphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-Engravers Ass'n, 155 F.2d 799 (C.C.A. 3d
1946).
150. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §6 (1940).
151. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. United States, 67 Sup, Ct.
775, 781, 784 (1947). Mr. Justice Jackson did not participate in the decision,
152. Id. at 788.
153. Id. at 789. The problem of construction might have been side-stepped, if 'the,
Court had held, as it did in United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 Sup, Ct, 677,
684-9 (1947), that the Act did not apply at all, but to do so it would have had to over-
rule Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, I.B.E.W., 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
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cutions involving unions.154  The decision in the Fay case C suggests that the
Court is unsympathetic to the notion that class antagonisms are a factor to
be reckoned with in the judicial process, while the Atkins opinion'" would
argue a real faith in the possibility of labor-management cooperation. The
Petrillo decision'57 seems too inconclusive to indicate anything of the Court's
substantive views, while the Lewvis casel zs was perhaps too much the product
of political turmoil to justify comment now. To date it has not produced any
unruly offspring.
The problem of state taxation of interstate business is not only one of the
most vexing political problems of the federal system; it is also an economic
problem of some importance in securing to each state a fair share of revenue
without overburdening the activities of national businesses. It is a problem
of considerable difficulty, because any general rule is likely to favor either
the industrialized creditor states of source, or the agricultural debtor states
of sale, to the proportionate disadvantage of the other group.1 -'
Since United States Glue Compan zv. Oak Creek0 0 the Court has divided
the question into two halves by making a broad distinction between gross
and net income taxes, holding that gross taxes alone may be challenged on
the ground that they impose an undue burden on interstate commerce.010
Since the line between gross and net taxes is one of legislative grace,lc2 the
distinction, although of long standing, seems a dubious one. It is particularly
unfortunate in view of the contrast between recent decisions based on the due
process clause, which require only the absence of discrimination and a rea-
154. There is an apparent inconsistency between this decision and the result in Harris
v. United States, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098 (1947), where the Court approved an extension of
the search and seizure power which should facilitate the enforcement work of regulatory
agencies, perhaps at the expense of minority groups.
155. Fay v. New York, 67 Sup. Ct. 1613 (1947) (claim of economic prejudice in se-
lection of "blue-ribbon" jury panel rejected).
156. NLRB v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 67 Sup. CL 1265 (1947) (certification of bargain-
ing unit approved for militarized plant guards).
157. United States v. Petrillo, 67 Sup. Ct. 1538 (1947) (constitutionality of Lea Act
approved on the face of the statute only).
158. United States v. United Mine Workers, 67 Sup. CL 677 (1947). See p. 1375
stpra.
159. See Rodell, A Primer of Interstate Taxation, 44 Y,rz L. J. 1166, 1175 (1935).
160. 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
161. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); Shaffer v.
Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 57 (1920). Comnpare Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S.
292 (1917), with Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918). Afte the U:derwood case,
the interstate commerce issue was not raised in net income tax cases.
162. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Helvering v.
Independent Life Insurance Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934); Brushaber v. Union Pacific
R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 23-4 (1916).
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sonable allocation fraction,163 and the current decisions'I under the com-
merce clause, which seem to follow no recognizable pattern.
After using a profusion of criteria,105 including transfer of title,100 locus
of physical delivery, 0 7 and a common sense test of the practical likelihood of
double taxation, 0 8 the Court has taken a new tack. The present majority of
five justices, 169 unwilling to follow Mr. Justice Black in leaving the entire
problem to Congress, absent the actuality, or even the threat, of double taxa-
tion,170 has invalidated two tax statutes this term' on the grounds that one
bore "directly" on interstate commerce,'17 and, in the second case, that the
operation taxed was not "sufficiently disjoined from commerce."'172 Such
criteria seem at best unclear, and- at worst likely to give unjustifiable exemp-
tions to interstate business at the expense of intrastate business. That it is
entirely a verbal standard is evident from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's approv-
ing citation of American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Lous,178 which reaches the
opposite result in a similar fact situation, because the tax is labelled "manu-
facturing". It is perhaps this abandonment of any attempt at a factual solu-
tion of the problem which the Court has taken upon itself, that explains Mr.
Justice Douglas' remark that "Freeman v. Hewit . . . marked the end of
one cycle under the Commerce Clause and the beginning of another."' 74
But the minority on the Court, except for Mr. Justice Black, is apparently
agreed that the problem is within the province of the judiciary, whether or
163. Speaking for a unanimous court in International Harvester v. Evatt, 329 U.S.
416, 422-3 (1947), Mr. Justice Black said: "Unless a palpably disproportionate result
comes from an apportionment, a result that makes it patent that the tax is levied upon
interstate commerce rather than upon an intrastate privilege, this Court has not been
willing to nullify honest state efforts to make apportionments." Compare Hans Rees'
Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931), with Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315
U.S. 501 (1942).
164. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 815 (1947); Freeman
v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946) ; both cases noted in 56 YALE L. J. 898 (1947). Cf. Rich-
field Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946).
165. Cf. Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota. 322 U.S. 292, 301, 302, 308 (three different
rationales for approval of the tax, and a fourth for disapproval).
166. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co.. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
167. International Harvester Co. v. Indiana, 322 U.S. 340 (1944).
168. Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
169. Justices Vinson, Reed, Jackson, Frankfurter, and Burton make up the group,
170. But four members are apparently reluctant to take a position as positive as that
developed in Mr. Justice Jackson's polemic on "Balkanizing American commerce." Duck-
worth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400-1 (1941). And see note 88 supra.
171. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253, 256, 257, 258 (1946).
172. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 815, 819 (1947). But
cf. Independent Warehouses Inc. v. Scheele, 67 Sup. Ct. 1062 (1947) (franchise tax on
warehouse upheld as against commerce clause objections, on property tax rationale).
173. 250 U.S. 459 (1919), cited in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 258 (1946).
And see note 88 supra.
174. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 67 Sup. Ct. 815, 827 (1947).
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not it is within its field of so-called special competence'75 And Mr. Justice
Rutledge has had the judicial temerity to suggest a working solution to the
double taxation problem, until such time as Congress chooses to act.170 For
that reason he concurred in the Hcwit decision, but only because the tax did
not fit into the formula he recommended. It may be that the application of
his formula should be deferred, as Mr. Justice Black has suggested,17 at
least until there is an actual instance of double taxation, for which Congress
makes no provision. The significance of the concurrence lies not in its timing,
but in the fact that Mr. Justice Rutledge is willing to make a frank, factual
proposal for the kind of interstitial judicial legislation which has always been
an essential part of the judicial process.- 8
CONCLUSION
A court of law cannot seek out issues to settle. But by the same token it
cannot avoid, though it may perhaps defer, handing down a decision in the
controversy before it. In that decision it can draw on a code of organic
law and statutes, on a body of previously decided controversies, on its knowl-
edge of the social situation in which the controversy takes place, and on its
own common sense and feeling for what is "fair" and "just". The present
175. Air. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the Court in Richfield Oil v. State
Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946), invalidating a California sales tax on foreign
exports, under the export-import clause, which he believes should be employed in its field
more as the majority of the Court apply the commerce clause. Hence his concurrence,
in part, as to the foreign commerce aspect of the Joseph case.
176. "As among the various possibilities, I think the solution most nearly in accord
with the commerce clause, at once most consistent with its purpose and least objection-
able for producing either evils it had no design to bring or practical difficulties in ad-
ministration, would be to vest the power to tax in the state of the market, subject to
power in the forwarding state also to tax by allowing credit to the full amount of any
tax paid or due at the destination." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 279 (1946).
177. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 445 (1939).
178. "Whether or not due process under the Fourteenth Amendment forbids state
taxation of acts, transactions, events or property is essentially a practical matter and
one of degree depending on the existence of sufficient factual connections . . . between
the taxing state and the subject of the tax." Air. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Green-
ough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 67 Sup. Ct. 1400, 1409 (1947).
"In the application of these principles some enactments may be found to be plainly
within and others plainly without state power. But between these extremes lies the in-
finite variety of cases. . . in which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and
national power is to be obtained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the com-
peting demands of the state and national interests involved." ir. Justice Stone in South-
ern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-9 (1945).
"In the silence of Congress the Court, perforce, must balance the interests according
to its view of sound policy, just as a court must decide ordinary causes in the absence of
applicable legislation." Sholley, supra note 41, at 594. See also Dowling, Interstate
Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. Rav. 1, 19, 20 (1940), Interstate Commerce and
State Power-Revised Version, 47 Cor. L. Ray. 547 (1947).
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Court finds little aid or comfort in most of these traditional guides to judg-
ment.
179
But the Court still sits, and the tradition of judicial review has survived
even the lean years of the last decade. All the justices have in fact partici-
pated in the assertion of considerable judicial power, although on a somewhat
different scale than in the immediate past, and on somewhat different matters.
The historical job of the Court as part of the working machinery df American
government apparently cannot be evaded, even by those most anxious to avoid
judicial "legislation". 8 0
There is, however, no real evidence as yet that the judicial power which the
New Court has inherited is being used consistently, consciously, and with
discretion l' l to further the broad purposes of American government. The
pattern of judicial intervention is spasmodic: now bold, now timid; in one
area giving the legislature new freedom, in another imposing puzzling re-
straints on the individual in his relation to the State. Perhaps one difficulty
is that the justices are still debating with each other in terms of the constitu-
tional formulas and controversies of the 'thirties. The dissents of' Holmes
and Brandeis are no more decisive for current problems than the language of
the Constitution was for them. Clearly judicial self-restraint is a caution
sign, not a guide-post, 8 2 and "special competence" is of little avail when the
Court acts "not by authority of our competence but by force of our commis-
sion. '"' A franker realization by the Court of the impact of its decisions on
the structure of American society might lead to a more sustained and effective
exercise of its powers as a component force in the dynamics of American
government.
179. The "three-fold leitnotif" of contemporary decisions is "awareness of freedom,
confession of fallibility, and quest for extra-legal guidance." Pekelis, supra note 71, at
613.
180. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Cardozo lecture, Sonte Reflections on the Reading
of Statutes, reprinted in 47 CoL. L. REv. 527 (1947) in which the Justice avoids the real
force of the problem by reference to statutory construction as an "art," the answers to
which "are in its exercise," and suggests that the ultimate reliance is on the caliber of
the Justices-an indisputable, if not a very constructive, conclusion, since he suggests no
criteria for distinguishing the good from the bad.
181. "Legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people
in quite as great a degree as the courts." Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri, K. & T. Ry.
v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
182.- Compare "A great part of [self-restraint] is .. .respect for the country's desire
to have its own way, and that is an act of faith, not of will." Curtis, op. cit. supra note
3, at 325, with "The political equilibrium is threatened today because administrative
agencies have seized the weapons offered by social science technology and outdistanced
the courts, shackled by their innocence of the methods of modern economics or psychol-
ogy." Pekelis, supra note 71, at 615.
183. Mr. Justice Jackson, for the Court, in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette; 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
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